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# Briefly Noted ✓

22 November 1965

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Threat to World Security Soviet Espionage Recounted to date of Soviet espionage abroad during the past forty years, Ronald Seth's *UNMASKED\**

Seth is well qualified for his task: he has more than thirty books on espionage and war to his credit; he served in British intelligence during WWII and parachuted into Estonia to organize resistance operations against the Germans.

Seth's historical section traces the philosophy of Soviet espionage back to the Tsars' Okhrana (counter-espionage organization) and its heavy reliance on agents provocateurs. He attributes the breakdown of Soviet agents under questioning largely to this orientation, and cites the behavior of Mikhail Gorin when arrested by the FBI in the late 1930's. Gorin, who did not have diplomatic immunity, implicated Ambassador Constantin Oumansky by calling upon him for instructions.

Both Soviet blunders and successes are recounted. Great Britain, one of the first major powers to recognize the USSR, broke off relations in 1927 because of the vast, although clumsy, Soviet espionage operations against her. French experience was similar but rather than break diplomatic relations after arresting a number of spies in Soviet employ, they dealt more cautiously with the Soviets, at least for a number of years.

Cases of Soviet espionage since WWII in the United States -- e.g., the Abel case, and in Great Britain -- e.g., the Blake, Vassall and Lonsdale cases, appear in the final chapters.

The author warns that official and public memories are short and that many more Soviet successes will be scored unless extreme vigilance is exercised. While some of his other conclusions are debatable, recent exposure of highly successful Soviet subversion of Scandinavian nationals testify to the serious threat RIS activities continue to pose to world security.

\*Ronald Seth *UNMASKED*, Hawthorn Books, Inc., Fifth Avenue, NY 10011. 306 pages \$5.95 [Published originally by Cassell in London as *FORTY YEARS OF SOVIET SPYING* 36/.]

Brezhnev Territorial Acquisitions. Belabors West Germany

Speaking at Kiev on 23 October, CPSU First Secretary Brezhnev asserted that the West German "revenge-seekers not only yearn for the lands beyond Elbe but also some territories of their allies."

Appropriate media should reply that there is no valid reason to assume that the German Federal Republic will emulate the Soviet Union -- which indeed has not only "yearned for," but has actually grasped territories of her allies, e.g., Eastern Poland, the Carpatho-Ukraine, Bessarabia, and so forth.

T H E R M I D O R

Historical  
Fact              vs.              Marxian  
                        Theory

Have you ever compared the major changes in  
SOVIET SOCIETY and in CPSU doctrine and pro-  
grams

*with*

the rise and fall of the FRENCH REVOLUTION?

The little booklet  
*THERMIDOR*  
will do it for you.

*The historical process, in which the climax  
of the French Revolution is symbolized in the  
term THERMIDOR, is remarkably similar to what  
has been and is happening in the Soviet Union.*

*Not only does this lesson (i.e., the anatomy  
of revolution) invalidate Marx' theory of the  
"inevitable" historical evolution of all so-  
ciety into a Communist form.*

*It shows equally well that the Communist model  
cannot sustain REVOLUTIONARY PROGRESS; that  
change must be made to liberalize activities  
to permit progress; or that a dictatorship must  
be maintained to dominate people, if and as  
possible.*

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# Significant Dates ▶

NOV.

- 16 Stalin, Zinoviev and Kamenev form ruling triumvirate ("troika") when second stroke ends Lenin's public career. 1922.
- 18 Lavrenti Beria tried and executed. (18-23 Nov.) 1953.
- 19 Vietminh attack on French at Haiphong begins 7 1/2 year war. 1946.
- 20 Council of People's Commissars creates Extraordinary Commission to Combat Counter-Revolution (CHEKA), secret police; forerunner of GPU (State Political Administration formed 8 February 1922), OGPU, NKVD and MVD.
- 20 UN makes second call on CPR for Tibetan freedom. 1953.
- 21 Joseph V. Stalin born. 1879. (Dies 5 March 1953.)
- 23 Inter-American Conference for Maintenance of Peace (1-23 Dec.) signs Treaty for Preservation of Peace. 1936.
- 26 Mao Tse-tung born. 1893.
- 27 Netherlands transfers sovereignty to interim Republic of United Provinces of Indonesia. 1949.
- 29 15th Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 29 December - 4 January.

JAN.

- 2 Fidel Castro assumes power, 1959.
- 3 Afro-Asian Latin American Conference (Tri-Continent Conference), Havana, 3-10 January, sponsored by the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization (Communist controlled).
- 6 President Roosevelt states Four Freedoms: of speech and expression, of worship; from want and from fear. 1941.
- 17 (Yugoslavia) Plenum of CP Central Committee expels Vice Premier Milovan Djilas for charging corruption among party leaders (1954). Djilas continues criticism, resigns party in April. 25 January 1955, tried for "anti-government propaganda" (interviews London Times, New York Times), given 18-month suspended sentence. 19 November 1956, arrested for article hailing Hungarian Revolt. 12 December 1956, sentenced 3 years' imprisonment for "hostile propaganda." 5 October 1957, sentenced additional 7 years "undermining peoples' authority" with book "The New Class." Conditionally released in December 1960. 7 April 1962, rearrested (for "Conversations with Stalin"). 14 May 1962, after secret trial sentenced 5 years plus remainder old term.

MEDIA LINES

Soviet News Agency -- Novosti or APN. The USSR plans to make APN (Agentsvo Petschati Novosti) a commercial type news service better able to compete with western agencies such as AP, UPI, AFP and with NCNA (New China News Agency). Soviet journalists have charged that TASS pushes the official Soviet line without regard to audience reaction, and insist that APN replace it as the USSR's propaganda voice abroad. Concerned with failure of Soviet press performance, particularly in the developing countries where NCNA is expanding its activities, APN plans to increase its coverage of foreign and domestic news while continuing to supply feature articles as in the past.

The Soviets will continue their attempts to project an image of APN as a non-official, independent news agency. It was sponsored at its inception in 1961 by four Soviet front organizations, including the All-Union Society for Dissemination of Scientific and Political Knowledge [formerly the League of Militant Godless].

Already operating in the USSR and abroad, it is expected that APN will increase its staff of foreign correspondents, and will work more energetically to capture additional markets for its services.

Mikhailov Returns to Prominence as Soviet Censorship Czar. Nikolai A. Mikhailov has been made Chairman of the Soviet Government's State Committee for Publishing. This office is responsible for censorship of the public press -- to prevent leaks of vital military, economic and political information, among other things. (See NY Times of 7 November.)

Stalin appointed Mikhailov head of the Komsomol in 1938; he remained for fourteen years. Shortly before Stalin's death in March 1953, Mikhailov was appointed to the Party Presidium, but since then he has spent much of his time out of the country, for example as Ambassador to Poland and later to Indonesia.

This appointment places one more former head of the Komsomol in a critical position in the current CPSU government. Both Aleksandr Shelepin and Vladimir Semichastny graduated from this position to become chief of the K.G.B. -- Committee of State Security (which the latter still holds).

#66

## Commentary

27 Oct-9 Nov 1965

### Principal Developments:

1. The Communist world marks the 28th anniversary of the Soviet "October Revolution" -- the universal Communist holiday for almost half a century. Although Soviet anniversary pronouncements are devoted largely to internal economic matters and to the common danger of imperialist aggression abroad, keynote speaker Polyansky defends Soviet ideological positions under Chinese attack somewhat more sharply than other post-Khrushchev Soviet statements. The Chinese are formally correct in their messages and speeches, but People's Daily features an obdurate -- though thinly veiled and relatively restrained -- polemical resume of Peking's case against CPSU positions. It sounds a call to "unite all forces that can be united to defeat U.S. imperialism and its lackeys, and to carry the revolution through to the end," blatantly appealing to the Soviet people over the heads of their leaders. The North Korean party echoes the Chinese call for struggle against modern revisionism, but the North Vietnamese express their thanks to the fraternal Soviet people. Only a few leaders of minor CPs (with possible exception of India's Dange) are reported in Moscow for the celebration, though the East European top brass participate in local celebrations in their respective capitals (except the Rumanians, as noted in para. 8).

2. A few days after the Afro-Asian Foreign Ministers yielded to Chinese pressure and decided to postpone the Algiers Conference indefinitely (#65), Peking People's Daily lambasts the Soviets for their "shocking" role in the whole affair -- again appealing to the Soviet people over the heads of the regime.

3. While the Soviets and their sympathizers view developments in Indonesia with increasing alarm, the Chinese and their comrades-in-arms denounce not only the "anti-PKI and anti-Chicom campaign of Indonesian reaction" but also Soviet complicity in it!

4. In addition to attacking the Soviets in connection with the above issues, the Chinese publicize the savage 16 October Albanian Zeri I Popullit attack on the new Soviet leadership in connection with the first anniversary of K's ouster (Chrono #65) and a series of articles from the Pakistan press which "lay bare Soviet-American collusion" on Kashmir.

5. Especially intriguing is some material the Chinese did not publish. On 1 November NCNA domestic service told its subscribers that People's Daily on the 2nd would devote 2 1/2 pages to the "anti-Chinese

comments issued by the leaders of the CPs of the Soviet Union and other countries and their press since the March Moscow schismatic meeting," together with an "editor's note" denouncing the "diabolical and scheming" new leaders of the CPSU and their "frequent and voluminous anti-Chinese instigation at home" and "covert anti-Chinese activities in many places abroad." NCNA listed the following anti-Chinese materials as included: 11 Soviet, 19 Czech, 10 Hungarian, 8 Bulgarian, 2 East German, 2 Polish, 7 Italian (L'Unita and Rinascita) and 6 French (L'Humanite). Only an hour later, however, NCNA transmitted a brief service message requesting that the above item be held up until further notice. The material has not been published by the end of our period.

6. Another secret top-level bilateral Party meeting in the Soviet camp -- between a Brezhnev-led Soviet and Gomulka-led Polish delegation, "somewhere" in Belorussia -- is announced after it is completed.

7. Pravda reports on the Soviet-line communique and resolution of "the fourth conference" of 6 Central American CPs in Mexico (including a call for a world CP meeting) and TASS announces the formation of a "Soviet committee to assist the first solidarity conference of the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America in Havana 3-10 January."

8. Tirana reports colorfully on a new "sharp clash" at an international front meeting: the WIDF Council in Salsburg, 26-29 October.

9. The Rumanians continue their independent ways, publicizing that Italian CP boss Longo recently again opposed a world unity conference (while omitting his criticism of the Chinese) and failing to have either Party boss Ceausescu or Premier Maurer attend the October Revolution celebration in their own capital -- in contrast to the other East European Communist states.


#### Significance:

Contrary to widespread speculation, the Soviets did not convene a "little summit" of sympathetic WCM leaders in connection with the Moscow Revolution celebration. Moreover, Soviet pronouncements on the occasion could not be taken as evidence of any decision to launch a new phase of more active and open opposition to the Chinese, even though Polyansky's keynote speech treated the issues in conflict somewhat more sharply than other post-Khrushchev leaders. The Chinese, on the other hand, attack the Soviets on all fronts, now appealing again to the Soviet people over the heads of the leaders as during the Khrushchev era. They also imply a possible initiative to organize their own M-L International in the 7 November People's Daily call to "unite all forces that can be united" for their objectives.

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If neither the simmering crisis in Indonesia, nor a renewed outbreak of hostilities between India and Pakistan lead to a new confrontation between Peking and Moscow, the 23rd CPSU Congress, scheduled for 29 March 1966 is likely to provoke new fireworks -- especially if it brings about (which we are not yet prepared to predict) changes in the top leadership or either an endorsement or a revision of the doctrinal structure, developed at the 20th, 21st and 22nd congresses, particularly concerning the Khrushchev-sponsored new party program, voted at the 22nd congress, 1961.



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CHRONOLOGY -- COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS

No. 66

27 October - 5 November 1965

AFRO-ASIAN CONFERENCE

Continued from #65: The Foreign Ministers Preparatory Meeting for the Second Afro-Asian Conference in Algiers convenes on the 30th (after postponement from the 26th), -- boycotted by the Chinese and their supporters in demanding an indefinite postponement of the conference -- N. Korea, N. Vietnam, Cambodia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Tanzania, Guinea, and Congo (Brazzaville). After 3 days of "unending haggling" (as NCNA puts it) over an immediate Indian motion to invite the Soviet Union and Malaysia, a Japanese proposal to include South Korea, and a Philippine proposal to include South Vietnam -- plus the Chinese-initiated proposal for postponement (which NCNA says was "put forward" by 17 countries present), the Foreign Ministers finally decide in the early hours of 2 November to postpone the summit conference and authorize the standing committee to continue its efforts to prepare for a conference at a future date.

Meanwhile, the North Korean government publicly calls for postponement (27th) and the North Vietnamese in Nhan Dan (28th). Registering the first Soviet comment on the Chinese decision to boycott the scheduled conference, Izvestiya (28th) equates the Chinese conduct with attempts by the Western imperialists to undermine the meeting, "to which the Soviet Union has given its whole-hearted support." A Peking People's Daily editorial (29th) blasts the "shocking attitude" of the Algerian hosts, their "crude violations of the principle of reaching consensus" in "forcibly convening the second A-A conference, thus pushing A-A solidarity into a split." NCNA issues an "authorized statement" (31st) denying Western press reports that China would agree to participate if it were postponed 3 months and the Soviet Union excluded. NCNA (2nd) reports the final decision on postponement without comment, but TASS quotes Bouteflika as "certain that I express general sentiments when I say that the attitude was in favor of Soviet participation." Yugoslav Tanyug (2nd) says that "the view widely prevails (in Algiers) that postponement of the conference has thrown a shadow over the relations between China and many Afro-Asian countries." Belgrade Borba (3rd) says that "China has experienced one of its greatest defeats on the international scene by failing to wreck Afro-Asian solidarity," and Kommunist (4th): "Chinese extremism has dealt a blow to Afro-Asian cooperation which is sure to have wider and manifold repercussions."

Having the last word on the subject, a People's Daily editorial (4th) not only crows over the "victory" but lambastes the Soviet for their role:

"To thrust itself into the Afro-Asian conference, the Soviet leading group went so far as to try to fish in troubled

waters at the peremptorily convened Foreign Ministers meeting ....To attain its aim, it did not even hesitate or feel ashamed to rank itself with that product of neocolonialism -- "Malaysia" -- or with the quislings of imperialism in South Vietnam and South Korea. This is indeed shocking. How can one allow the country born of the Great October Revolution to be placed side by side with puppet regimes that are the offspring of British and U.S. imperialism? Of course, this cannot have been the will of the great Soviet people: it is, in fact, an insult to them...."

#### INDONESIA

Continued from #65: While the Soviets and their sympathizers continue to view with concern developments in Indonesia, the Chinese and their comrades-in-arms increasingly denounce "the anti-PKI and anti-Chinese campaign of Indonesian reaction," -- and Soviet complicity in it! Again the Albanians take the lead: NCNA (27 Oct) publicizes an AWP resolution of the 26th which says that "the reactionary rightist armed forces of Indonesia, at the instigation and with the active support of the American imperialists and the Khrushchev revisionists, have launched a rabid campaign against the progressive and democratic forces of the fraternal Indonesian people and particularly the PKI." A Zeri I Popullit article (2nd) charges that "these provocative and crude acts represent composite parts of a single plan, of a premeditated, manifold, and hostile campaign directed against the CPR by American imperialism, the Khrushchevite revisionists, and international reaction...." It calls on "the revolutionary Marxist-Leninist parties, the progressive peoples, and all revolutionaries and honest men" to defend the CPR -- "the impregnable fortress of the revolution, progress, and socialism" -- and strike a lightning blow against "the imperialist-revisionist 'Holy Alliance' which presently constitutes the greatest danger for the peoples' liberty and peace." NCNA publicizes (3rd) a statement by New Zealand CP Gensecy Wilcox published that date in People's Voice calling for "the firmest backing and support for the PKI by the ICM"; and (on the 4th) an article from Vanguard, organ of the pro-Chinese Australian dissident CP (M-L), including the charge:

"True to their role as handmaidens and counterparts to the U.S. imperialists, the Soviet revisionists have been busy trying to undermine the mighty PKI....The PKI as part of its heroic, patriotic stand has been an unwavering opponent of revisionism because revisionism is the betrayal of the national independence of Indonesia (and every other country)...."

ZIP again (4th) flays the Soviets with the "unholy Alliance" charge in a new article: "The Imperialists, the Khrushchevite Revisionists, and Others in Chorus Against the PKI."

NCNA publishes (5th) the text of a new Chinese Government note of "strongest protest" to the Indonesian Government of a new "extremely serious incident in which rioters organized by the Indonesian right-wing forces raided the Chinese Consulate in Medan on 2 November and insulted China's national flag, national emblem, and leader." The note says that "the rioters outrageously shouted such slogans as "Down with the CPR" and "Down with Mao Tse-tung," and asserts that the raid was "carried out at the instigation and with the support of the Medan military and governmental authorities."

"The above-mentioned outrage committed by the Indonesian right-wing forces constituted a gross violation of accepted principles of international law and a rude encroachment on the privileges enjoyed by the Chinese Consulate and the personal safety of its personnel. It seriously affronted the dignity of the Chinese state, and hurt the feelings of the Chinese people. It further damaged the foundation of the friendly relations between China and Indonesia. It was an extremely serious provocation against the CPR and the Chinese people...."

The note demands public apology, restitution, punishment of the culprits and instigators and insurance of safety of other Chinese Consulates. Peking papers (6th) front-page this note and an NCNA round-up entitled "evil Anti-China Current Spreading in Indonesia." It follows on the next day with another long round-up headed: "Rabid Anti-Communist, Anti-popular Activities of Indonesian Right-wing Forces."

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October 26-28; November 2,4: In a long speech at an Italian CP plenum, Secygen Longo reportedly reiterates CPI opposition to any further efforts at a Communist unity conference at this time and criticizes Chinese policies. (Translation not yet available.) Rumanian Party daily Scienteia (2 Nov) and weekly Lumea (4th) prominently play Longo's opposition to conference, -- while omitting reference to his criticism of Peking.

October 27: A Pravda editorial surveying "The Supreme International Duty of the Country of Socialism" firmly reaffirms Soviet positions in the Sino-Soviet conflict, without naming the Chinese.

"Despite the slander by the Soviet Union's enemies, people struggling against imperialism know well our country's clear and unambiguous anti-imperialist position....The touchstone on which the sincerity of the intentions of any revolutionary are tested is the struggle against imperialism.... Communists and workers of all countries judge the devotion of one or another party to M-L primarily by its deeds and

the way in which it rebuffs the forces of imperialist reaction and aggression....

"Our party strictly adheres to the call of the March 1965 consultative meeting of representatives of Communist and workers parties for an end to open polemics in the WCM...."

October 30: NCNA publicizes the 16 October Albanian Zeri I Popullit lead article on the first anniversary of K's ouster. (#65, October 13-16), including passages such as: "Demagogy, cynicism, dissimulation, and chameleon-like behavior have become the principle methods of the present Soviet leadership's perfidious activities."

October 30; November 3, 4: NCNA reports from Karachi on a series of recent articles in the Pakistan press which "lay bare the collusion of the U.S. and the Soviet Union in the UN Security Council to obstruct a reasonable settlement of the Kashmir question and to back the Indian attempt to occupy Kashmir permanently."

October 31: TASS announces that a top-level meeting between a Brezhnev-led CPSU delegation and a Gomulka-led Polish Party delegation took place on 29-30 October "in Belorussia," -- "in an atmosphere of complete unanimity and unity of views."

November 1: Pravda carries a report by its Mexico correspondent, V. Dulgov, on "the fourth conference of representatives of Communist and workers parties of Mexico, Guatemala, Salvador, Honduras, Costa Rica, and Panama, citing a communique and resolution published by Voz de Mexico. Expressing "concern that unanimity has still not been achieved on several questions of principle in the WCM," the communique says that "our parties agree with the conclusions" of the March Moscow consultative meeting, "considering that under present conditions the path to the achievement of unity is the path of joint struggle against the common enemy and the holding of consultative meetings with the aim of calling a conference of all Communist and workers parties."

November 2: Radio Tirana, reporting on a Salzburg meeting of the WIDF (Women's International Democratic Federation) Council, 26-29 October, says that "a sharp clash developed" there between those "who stand on strong positions and defend the militant traditions of the federation" and those "who have fallen under the influence of the modern revisionists and who want to deprive the federation of its militant spirit and turn it into an instrument for imposing on the masses of women their revisionist policy of submission and capitulation to imperialism."

"...The Albanian delegate wanted to answer Jeanette Vermeersch (French CP), who, in her speeches, accused the Albanian People's Republic, the CPR, and other countries which oppose the Moscow treaty of standing on the imperialist

side. But the chairman of the session did not let her speak, switched off the microphones, and a great tumult ensued in the hall. Some of the representatives of the modern revisionists left the room...."

November 3: TASS announces that a Soviet committee, chaired by writer Mirzo Tursun-Zade, has been set up in Moscow "to assist the first solidarity conference of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America to be held in Havana 3-10 January."

November 6-7: The 48th anniversary of the Soviet "October Revolution" is marked throughout the Communist world by the usual meetings, speeches, messages and editorials. Contrary to speculation that the event would be used to cover a meeting of Soviet-aligned parties in Moscow, TASS reporting indicates that there is high-level representation from only one of the ruling parties, the Cuban (Raul Castro), and only four of the non-ruling parties -- Spain (Ibarruru and Santiago Carrillo), Portugal (Alvaro Cunhal), India (Dange) and Syria (Bakdash). Leaders of the East European parties attend the rallies in their own capitals -- except for the Rumanians Ceausescu and Maurer, who are visiting the University in Cluj.

Moscow keynote speech by Dmitriy Polyansky, is devoted largely to Soviet domestic economic matters, is slightly sharper than other recent Soviet statements in defending Soviet ideological positions under attack by the Chinese.

"Due to its deep inner superiority over capitalism, socialism does not require that the revolutionary struggle in any part of the world be given pushes from the outside. Our party has always been against exporting revolution, as well as exporting counter-revolution. 'Of course,' Lenin wrote, 'there are people who think that revolution can develop in a foreign country by order and agreement. These people are either mad or provocateurs.'..."

"We are trying to improve relations, to regulate differences, and to strengthen friendship with the CPR. On our part, everything possible has been done for this purpose. However, the question of the development of relations between the CPSU and the CCP depends on the Chinese leaders...."

Pravda editorials (5th and 6th) are less specific, speaking blandly of the struggle for peace and the need for unity.

Chinese speeches and messages are formally correct, but a People's Daily editorial (7th) is an obdurate, though relatively restrained, polemical resume of their case against CPSU positions:

"...The history of the October Revolution and the history of the revolution in various countries of the world indicates that the seizure of political power by armed force is the central task and the highest form of revolution. This is a universal law applicable to the revolution of the people of various countries and irresistible truth.

"The road of the October revolution was the road of dictatorship of the proletariat and of carrying out the socialist revolution to the end....Efforts should be made to adhere strictly to the dictatorship of the proletariat....

"...Nobody can alter the general law of development of world history that the East wind prevails over the West wind....

"...The glorious historical mission of the international proletariat is to raise aloft the banner of M-L, the banner of the October Revolution, the banner of proletarian internationalism, to unite all forces that can be united, to defeat U.S. imperialism and its lackeys, and to carry the revolution through to the end.

"To fulfill its historic mission, it is necessary to carry out a struggle against modern revisionism and modern doctrinairism which deviate from M-L; particularly, an uncompromising struggle should be waged against modern revisionism, the main danger in the ICM at present....

"History has already proved and will continue to prove that whoever betrays M-L, the path of the October Revolution, and proletarian internationalism, will sooner or later be rejected by the broad masses of the revolutionary people and will be shunted to the sidelines of history....

"...We have always cherished great respect for the great Soviet people and looked on them as our own intimate reliable friends....The damage suffered in the past several years in the relations between the CCP and the CPSU and between the two countries is not due to any fault of ours. This is something neither we nor the Soviet people like to see. We believe that the difficulties in Sino-Soviet relations are but an interlude in the long river of history and that the traditional friendship between the Chinese and Soviet people can withstand the test of storms and can last forever...."

North Korean Party daily Nodong Sinmun editorial (7th) includes a call to "fight against modern revisionism, the main danger to the WCM at present." North Vietnamese Party daily Nhan Dan does not mention modern revisionism as it expresses "sincere thanks to the fraternal Soviet people" and extolls their "relations of friendship and cooperation" on the basis of M-L and proletarian internationalism.

22 November 1965

962.

REVOLUTIONARY PROGRESS AND COMMUNISM

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SITUATION: Communists have attempted to monopolize the term revolutionary change and to make it synonymous with their concept of progress. All too often they successfully appeal to the underprivileged or "have nots" and to those driven to create a "new world" by advocating the use of force or the destruction of political or socio-economic institutions as the only path to progressive revolutionary change.

As a counterpart to this effort, communists attempt to pin the label reactionary on all free world forces (the U.S. and former colonial powers in particular), and thus to destroy the influence of the mature nations in developing areas. They also misleadingly describe the U.S., for example, as supporting all policies of regimes in developing areas which do resist change, and apply the term status quo (or reactionary) as a symbol for those who reject revolutionary progress. U.S. efforts to persuade foreign regimes to make needed changes are cavalierly ignored or branded as imperialist - neocolonialist interfering in the internal affairs of other countries.

Many leaders in all sectors of society fail to recognize or prefer to ignore the fact that the communists call only upon non-communists countries to carry out violent revolution. It is all too seldom observed that once communists attain power over a country, the dictatorship of the "proletariat" enforces communist institutions and maintains a status quo within the society based on a blue print designed half a century ago and a doctrine enunciated (by Marx) more than a century ago. Communist dictatorships euphemistically call upon the proletariat to "complete the revolution" -- i.e., to maintain the system set down by the Party.

Similarly, leaders in developing countries too often fail to recognize the revolutionary strides made by mature nations. Domestically this has been accomplished by extending the fruits of economic, technological, political, civic and cultural revolutions to ever widening sectors of the population (U.S., Germany, Japan) and in changing institutions through legal and constitutional processes. Internationally this is seen in the truly revolutionary endeavors to establish international principles and

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(962 Cont.)

bodies (UN and its many bodies, World Bank, OAS), in subordinating certain sovereign rights to collaborative activity, and in assuming responsibility for peace and progress for the whole world.

Communist-style Revolution: post World War II. A sizable part of public opinion in the free world, including certain Western leaders, hoped during World War Two that the fight against Hitler, in which the Soviet Union and the Western powers were allies, would lead to a better understanding between Communists and the free world after Hitler and his axis were defeated. This hope soon proved to have been deceptive wishful thinking: the Communists even used the last phases of the war -- once the immediate threat of a Soviet collapse under the Nazi onslaught had been removed (with Western aid) -- to further their post-war aims against the West.

The mutiny of the Greek fleet in exile, the establishment of the "National Committee Free Germany" as the base for a future German government and of the "Lublin Committee" as a future Polish regime, Communist infiltration of resistance movements, large-scale caching of arms, provided by the West to fight Hitler, for future uprisings (notable by the Communist partisans in Italy), Stalin's refusal to set up a joint administration for the occupied enemy territories and many other developments revealed that the war had not at all changed the Communist grand design to conquer the world, including the overthrow of their war-time allies.

Consequently, no genuine and permanent peace settlements became possible after World War Two: only in areas of limited strategic importance, such as Austria, or where the West acted alone, as in Japan, was the war truly liquidated. Everywhere else, temporary arrangements were the only possible solution. They involved notably

the division of three countries into Communist and non-Communist portions -- Germany, Korea and (later) Vietnam;

Western de facto (though not de jure) acquiescence in Communist land grabs -- such as the Baltic States, East Prussia, Southern Sakhalin and the Kurile islands (the latter two taken from Japan); and

"temporary" border lines which have, however, already lasted 20 years and are likely to last longer (notably the Oder-Neisse line, placing Silesia, Eastern Pomerania and other former German territories under "Polish administration pending a German peace treaty").

These compromise solutions, intended to re-establish a world-wide balance of power after World War Two, benefited only the Communists -- except that they limited their expansion (they obtained only part of the three divided countries -- where they had wanted all of them). The Soviet Union is the o n l y major belligerent of World War Two which has

emerged with major territorial gains from the war, including vast areas taken from her now Communist "allies" -- such as Eastern Poland, the Carpatho-Ukraine taken from Czechoslovakia and Bessarabia taken from Rumania. Despite these sizable gains, the Communists tried several times to change the balance of power by force:

Berlin blockade -- 1948/49

Invasion of South Korea -- 1950/53

All these attempts, undertaken with overt military force, ended in defeats for the Communists. Attempts to gain additional territory through internal (coups) and guerrilla warfare were successful only in Czechoslovakia (and, at least indirectly, in Cuba), but failed in Greece, the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaya.

Wherever it is to their advantage, the Communists, especially the leadership of the Soviet Union, have been stout defenders of agreements, arrived at since 1945 -- which is not surprising since they greatly benefited from them. They keep 20 Soviet army divisions in East Germany to sustain the Communist regime there against an uprising of its own subjects, as on 17 June 1953. They protest violently whenever the fate of Eastern Europe is commemorated in "Captive Nations Week." They greatly appreciate De Gaulle's recognition of the Oder-Neisse Line as Poland's permanent border (whereas the other Western powers still maintain that the border between Poland and Germany can only be settled at the German peace conference). They make persistent efforts to improve East Germany's shaky international status -- see, for instance, East German party leader's Ulbricht recent state visit to Egypt, which was brought about when CPSU Presidium member and former KGB chief Shelepin "induced" Nasser -- badly in need of more Soviet military and economic aid -- to extend an invitation. In these places they support the status quo.

CPR-USSR Revolutionary Strategy Conflict. The open declaration of Chinese People's Republic (CPR) policy in the Lin Piao statement of 27 September 1965 (see BPG #175) and in Chen Yi's vitriolic statements to journalists in Peking in a four-hour interview at the end of September, spell out the doctrine of revolutionary change by violence which they have practiced for years. CPR strategy conflicts sharply with that of the USSR which is more subtle: it is based on retaining what they have gained on the one hand (status quo); and on the other, by destructively subverting free countries -- e.g., generally through "national wars of liberation" in Africa, and popular front tactics in Latin America. The CPR upset the Soviet strategy and timetable by its open aggression in Asia. So the USSR has conveniently "forgotten" about the Geneva agreement in which Vietnam was divided (because this turned out to be the only way in which overt warfare between Communists and the free world could be brought to an end). The communists, including the Soviets, not only pour men, arms supplies and political support from North Vietnam into free South

Vietnam, but they denounce the U.S., assisting the government of South Vietnam in defending its territory, as "imperialist aggressor," "warmonger" and general villain. Moreover, these Communist accusations are widely echoed by non-Communist critics of U.S. action in Vietnam (or of U.S. policies generally) -- by neutralists, pacifists, De Gaulle's propaganda machine, etc. -- with no reference to the international context which we outlined above.

U.S. Reaction to Communist Double Standards. Efforts of the free world and the U.S. in particular, to stabilize international relations by agreement while working for change and progress within the rule of law and through international diplomatic negotiation, have been increasingly difficult.. Communist parties to agreements persist in using a double standard: they abide by agreements to stabilize the situation when it appears to their advantage -- e.g., Germany, East European boundaries, and Laos (at least verbally for the moment); they abrogate agreements which no longer serve their purposes by armed aggression, support for internal uprisings, and other destructive activities. The result has been that the U.S. has had to use force, where Communists have applied the sharp side of their double standard and sought to take territory by armed aggression.

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22 November 1965

963.

COMMUNIST CHINA: Totalitarian Militarism,  
Its Nature and Its Goals

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SITUATION: Communist China today is the most thoroughly militarized nation in the world -- not only does she have a standing army of close to 2.5 million and vast Chinese reserves readily available to double and treble that number, she has in addition the greatest militia force ever claimed by any nation (best minimal estimate, 20,000,000).

Militaristic indoctrination runs throughout the entire structure of Chinese Communist society where student and youth groups, professional people, commune workers, women's leagues -- in fact, every layer of her bustling life, is daily being thoroughly steeped in militant Communist ideology. And at the apex of this massive ideological base stands Mao Tse-tung surrounded by a Central Committee and a Presidium both boasting more professional military men as members than any Communist structure in the world -- including that of the USSR.

Over three decades ago, in the early days of the Revolution Mao made the statement that "in China, war is the main force of struggle." Mao still rules China with this philosophy in the nuclear age. The crux of his military philosophy rests today - as it did in the days of the Revolution - on the "mass line" strategy despite the technological advances in the methods mankind now has available for waging war.

In considering war as it is fought today Mao does actually calculate that his armies may have to battle superior military forces, but he carefully sets up specific conditions for his battles: first, the Chinese people, military and civilians alike, must be thoroughly indoctrinated ideologically and must be taught a rabid hatred for the enemy; second,


superior intelligence and propaganda mechanisms must be developed under party and military control; and third, physical conditions must exist to permit Chinese forces to employ encircling, surprise attacks against the enemy. Daily intelligence on the enemy's movements and regular supplies will be furnished for Mao's forces by the Chinese civilians -- an actively mobilized and organized force.

In the gospel according to Mao, when these factors are functioning properly, the vast numbers of the Chinese fighting force, the skill of their ambushes and the strategy of their retreats will prolong the war to the point where the enemy's morale and resolve are so weakened and his supply lines are so overextended that Chinese Communist forces will win through to victory.

Mao's military doctrine was effective in the days of the Revolution and guerrilla armies but there are numerous indications that his former comrades-in-arms, China's professional military men, are protesting Mao's persistence in clinging to the military tactics of Revolutionary days in the face of the brutal realities of present day battle conditions. Mao has actually met with setbacks and even some direct challenges from his military leaders because of his attempts to inject party influence into the People's Liberation Army (PLA), China's mighty ground forces.

A review of the past 15 years makes it appear possible, in fact, that Chinese military men have become professional soldiers first and CCP apologists last. Attached is an unclassified outline of what may chronicle a running battle between major factions warring within the PLA: the practical professional soldiers versus the hidebound professional party men.

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964.

~~25X1C105~~ CUBAN EXODUS IS SYMBOL OF REGIME'S BANKRUPTCY

\* \* \* \* \*

SITUATION: In a speech delivered in Havana on 28 September 1965, Fidel Castro said that persons with relatives in the United States could leave Cuba. On 30 September, he offered to permit any persons who so desired to leave Cuba. Four days later, on 3 October 1965, President Johnson stated that the United States would welcome any Cubans who desired to go there. After several weeks of negotiations, via the intermediary of the Swiss Ambassador to Cuba, an agreement was reached between the United States and Cuba providing for the transfer of 4,000 Cubans per month from Cuba to the U.S.A. by chartered airplanes. In principle, this exodus will continue until those who desire to have left. However, despite the categorical nature of his early statements, Castro has now excluded young men of military age between 15 and 26, technicians, professional persons, and political prisoners.

The Cuban exiles already in the United States have submitted the names of some 150,000 relatives who are presently in Cuba; however it is not known how many of these will actually leave.

According to the International Rescue Committee, to date from 300,000 to 400,000 Cubans have left their homeland. Even the smaller figure represents 4.1% of Cuba's population of about 7,203,000. If an additional 200,000 manage to leave, this would mean a total of 7% of the population. Compare with the approximately 14% who left East Germany from 1946 to the present time.

Departing Cuba is not without risk or without loss. To leave via chartered plane, the Cuban will henceforth have to file application with the government. He must then wait until the government notifies him that his turn has come. In the interim, perhaps a period of a year or more, he must face the entire array of a hostile Communist government on which he must depend for everything from food rations to medicine for his children. His possessions immediately inventoried, and then reinventoried when he leaves to ensure that he has not sold anything and hidden the money. When he is finally permitted to depart he may take only what he can fit in a suitcase; everything else -- car, house, furniture, clothes, works of art, everything -- is then confiscated by the Cuban government.

It is not possible to estimate the total number of refugees who will leave Cuba, or the length of time over which their departure will take place. It could be speculated, however, that a departure rate of 4,000 a month would mean an average of 133 people leaving per day. If a total of 50,000 people were to leave, this exodus could then take twelve and a half months. If a total of 200,000 were to leave, the operation could last over four years.

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965.

## SOVIET HOUSING PROBLEMS



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SITUATION: Housing continues to be one of the glaringly inadequate sectors of the Soviet economy. CPSU leaders have bragged for years that they would "catch up" with Western Europe in housing standards -- as they have said repeatedly that they would catch up with the United States in the supply of meats, dairy products and other food commodities, only to suffer continued agricultural failures.

Their current seven-year plan (1959-1965) is far short of its goal of 887 million square meters (sq m) of dwelling space, and the quality of the new structures is generally poor. In only one year has this plan for housing been fulfilled; since 1960 the construction of new housing space has actually fallen off, and the total area of housing is lower now than that achieved in 1959. While the overall plan has been only 76.4% fulfilled the portion for collective farmers and rural intelligentsia (e.g., professionals, teachers) has been only half completed.

USSR minimum health and decency standards call for 9 sq m of living space (i.e., living, dining and bedrooms) within 13.5 sq m of total space (includes kitchen and bathroom) per person. The construction achieved by the end of 1964 falls short of this standard by 4.9 sq m of total space. Nine times the construction of urban-type housing attained in 1964 will have to be built in the urban and state sector of rural housing to reach this goal -- or an additional 673 million sq m. If this population continues to grow by approximately 3 million persons per year, and approximately 2% of the housing stock is retired from service each year, then almost 50 million sq m of urban-type housing must be built each year just to maintain the level of 8.6 sq m of total space per capita now attained.

Actual Soviet housing of 8 to 9 sq m of total space per capita is very low compared with amounts achieved in the West -- approximately 20 sq m in Western Europe and 30 sq m in the United States. It is very doubtful that the Soviet Union's own goal of 13.5 sq m total housing space per person can be attained by 1970. But achievement of the goal by 1980, which would require average annual completions to increase by 5% per year, is not an unreasonable task.

The goal of 887 million sq m may have been estimated on the previous performance rate in individual housing which accounted for about one half of the total area of housing constructed in the 1956-1959 period. But individual housing has been curtailed in the last seven years by numerous factors: failure to make land available or to provide utilities to the land made available; lack of construction materials; restriction on credit; and confiscation of individual houses already built. While individual housing -- which the Soviet people clearly desire -- may be stimulated by relaxing restrictive policies, on financing for example, this is not likely to occur in urban areas. Control of housing construction in the USSR is strictly a political decision: individual housing creates an urban sprawl requiring vastly larger public expenditures for utilities (e.g., transportation, power, sewers, fuel) than do apartment buildings; the Party is not likely to accommodate its people at this expense.

Investment. During the seven-year period, investment for housing construction has been declining in importance. In 1958 housing construction received 25% of Soviet investment; in 1963, only 18% and the estimate for 1964 and 1965 appeared even lower. The decrease in the sector of individual housing is even greater: 1964 investment was approximately half of that for 1959. Thus, in the field of shifting priorities in the Soviet economy, the so-called productive investment (e.g., industry, agriculture) took precedence over investment in housing. The Brezhnev-Kosygin administration, which has posed as the friend of the consumer, allocates first priority to defense and to industry, clearly preventing any immediate jump in consumer standards, particularly for housing.


Housing construction cooperatives are formed by groups of individuals each of whom furnishes the cost of constructing his apartment. Usual practice has been for the individual to provide 40% of the estimated cost of his apartment from his own funds and borrow the balance to be paid back in 10 to 15 years. The apartments are built by the state -- using the same plans, the same construction forces and materials and the same supervising organizations as state financed buildings. Only the financing differs. The incentive for joining a construction cooperative is simply that the person moves to the front of the long queue of applicants for housing. The incentive for the government in organizing cooperatives is that it avoids adverse publicity for an overt price increase for housing and raises the price for housing greatly. The down payment (even if the percentage should be reduced to the 27-30% advocated by some) equals or exceeds the annual wage of the average worker, and his monthly payment (even for the longer 25 year period suggested by some) is at least two to three times the rental paid for state housing. Cooperative apartments contributed insignificant amounts to housing construction in 1960 but rose to some 4.8 million sq m in 1964. It accounted for some 2% of the total 7-year construction total. Bank officials hope that more liberal financing will increase this up to 50% in coming years.

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Quality. The defects long noted in products sent abroad plague the housing industry in the Soviet Union. The Soviet press continually exhorts builders to improve quality. For example, houses which have been built remain unoccupied because there are no water, sewer, electrical, heating or transportation facilities. In one city, of 115 buildings put into service, 108 had serious defects. Concrete and mortar frequently contain dirt and other foreign matter; forms used are irregular in shape; joint designs and sealing materials are poor so that wind and moisture penetrates; brick, which is still the predominant material for walls, are weak, irregular in form and subject to frost damage; and lumber is often uncured and warps or shrinks.

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22 November 1965

Communist China's PLA  
Chronology of Policy Controversy  
1950 -- 1965

Prior to the  
Korean War:

Communist China still had a revolutionary volunteer force composed of those elements of the PLA which eventually drove the armies of Chiang-Kai-shek from the Chinese mainland in 1949.

1950-1954:

With essentially the same volunteer revolutionary force, the Chinese Communists entered the Korean War in November of 1950 and were initially successful in capitalizing on the element of surprise and the use of the "human wave" tactic. However, the superior firepower of the UN forces combined with the PLA's overwhelming supply problems proved insurmountable obstacles to Communist victory.

1954:

The Chinese made efforts after the Korean War to convert their forces to a regular military establishment. Internally, then Defense Minister Peng Te-huai introduced one clear sign of professionalism: ranks with differential pay scales.

1954 - mid

1960:

Externally, the Chinese Communists obtained Soviet support for the modernization of the PLA which was modeled along Soviet World War II lines.

1957:

Date of the Sino-Soviet pact under which Moscow agreed to assist Peking in nuclear and advanced weapons development.

1957-1959:

Signs that differences of opinion were growing among CCP leaders centering about the Great Leap Forward: some of the top military men in the PLA begged that concessions be made to Soviet objections regarding the impracticality of the Leap in order to keep the flow of Soviet assistance moving to the developing Chinese military forces.

1958:

A marathon May to July conference of top Chinese Communist military leaders took place during which some officers pushed hard for wiping out party leadership in the PLA.

(Cont.)

October 1958: The officer corps was reshuffled to bring into more prominence politically reliable military men; the Chief of the General Staff (General Su Yu) was replaced by a General (Huang Ko-cheng) whose aim it was to underline the claim that the party was in control of the PLA.

1959: A suspected confrontation between MAO and Defense Minister Peng Te-huai when Peng attempted to "regularize" the armed forces by emphasizing professionalism in the officer corps and eliminating party considerations. This resulted in Peng's (one of Mao's revolution comrades), dismissal. A number of his supporters, including the then Chief of Staff (Huang Ko-cheng) were also thrown out at the same time in what was described in a Chinese army bulletin as "a purge of rotten elements."

1960: The Soviets withdrew most of their support from the Chinese Communists in the weapons, nuclear and industrial development areas as well as training, and direct military aid. This was the culmination of the "Great Leap Forward" debate and the temporary cessation of modernization of the PLA.

1961: The "purge of rotten elements" from the PLA leadership was completed presumably leaving only party-oriented military leaders in command.

October 1963: Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi stated that China would have to manufacture nuclear weapons, missiles and supersonic aircraft or degenerate into a third-class nation.

1964: During this year Chinese leaders admitted that their program to develop an atomic bomb had been a severe strain on the economy. At the same time, Mao's concept of the spiritual atom bomb was being widely touted for general consumption as was the alleged superiority of man over weapons.

Early 1965: Reports made to the National People's Congress indicated that elements of the PLA leadership were still unhappy over the loss of Soviet military assistance and felt that party policy towards the Soviet Union should compromise sufficiently to heal the breach.

1 June 1965: An order was given abolishing all formal military ranks in the PLA because, according to Peking, it was "necessary to make the army more proletarian and militant." All insignia to be removed from uniforms. It has been speculated that this order was accompanied by a 50% cut in pay for officers.

Mid-July 1965: Peking announced that it would intensify the already heavy level of political indoctrination given to officers above the regimental level.

1 August 1965: An article by Marshal Ho Lung, Mao's old comrade and Politburo member, admitted that the PLA had displayed "stubborn bourgeois opposition" to Mao's military ideas and that the CCP had been forced to deal with this situation "again and again." The article simultaneously appeared in the Red Flag, the Liberation Army Daily and the People's Daily.

MANCHESTER GUARDIAN  
11 June 1965

CPYRGHT

# China revives anti-officer theme

CPYRGHT

Every soldier, says a commentary in the Peking "People's Daily" on the latest reform of the Chinese Army, "has the right to criticise his superiors at particular meetings . . . or to go over the heads of his immediate superiors to put his opinions to the cadres at higher levels."

In both the Soviet and Chinese armies the anti-officer theme has appeared whenever the party leadership has felt that it had reason to distrust the military leadership. At different times the propaganda line took different forms, but usually it was connected with what the party leaders regarded—or claimed to regard—as a military attempt to oppose the political leadership or even to take it over.

The "People's Daily" article provides an altogether new insight into the abolition of ranks in the Chinese Army at the beginning of this month. At first, official Peking commentaries represented the reform as no more than a return to the best revolutionary traditions.

The only implied criticism of the officer corps that the "Liberation Army Daily" allowed itself in announcing the abolition of ranks was to say that they had contributed to rank consciousness and the craving for fame and wealth.

## Unhealthy trends

Now, however, the "People's Daily" has given the additional explanation that, since democracy means equality between the soldiers and the cadres, "every revolutionary soldier has the right to oppose any actions which run counter to the party's policy, and any unhealthy trends." Both in training and in action, "the men are expected to discuss the ways and means of putting the plans into practice."

In battle conditions, "the men have full discussions on how to take the enemy position and how to accomplish their combat mission." When the battle is over, "they are expected to comment on the battle, the command, the discipline, and the actions and courage of the soldier."

A previous campaign on this subject in the Chinese press coincided, in 1959, with the dismissal of Peng Teh-huai, a member of the politburo, as Minister of Defence. At that time no direct criticism of him was published, but the suspicion

By VICTOR ZORZA

that the campaign had been aimed at a military-political opposition was borne out when a series of secret bulletins on Army activities fell into the hands of US intelligence.

These bulletins, covering a major part of 1961, did not refer in detail to the events of previous years but they linked the name of Peng Teh-huai with those of other officers—including the then Chief of Staff—as "representing the military line of the bourgeoisie." They had also opposed Mao Tse-tung's "basic principles on the development of the Army."

Among their chief crimes was their insistence on "the purely military viewpoint and warlordism," that is to say, their wish to manage the army in accordance with professional military requirements.

None of this has been discussed in the open press, but the official insistence that "politics must take command" even in the army, which formed the main theme of the press campaign, indicated the seriousness of the rift between the military and the party leaders.

There is also reason to believe that Peng Teh-huai was less willing than his associates to see the widening of the rift with Russia, since this was bound to deprive his army of much essential equipment which China could not manufacture.

The military opposition to the party leaders' insistence on organising a huge militia force—which at one time was said to number 220 million—was another issue in the leadership struggle. The army, it could be deduced from the Chinese press, resented the disruption of its own training and supply programmes brought about by the diversion of efforts to the militia.

But most of all, it seems, the professional officers who only a few years before had been indistinguishable from the party leaders were becoming a class in their own right, with interests, requirements, and even political views that were shaped increasingly by their occupation, and less and less by their party background.

This is what seems to have happened once again, for much the same reasons as before. The dismissal of Peng Teh-huai was followed, according to the army bulletin, by a purge of "rotten" elements which was completed

political campaign culminated in 1963 in the adoption of new rules on party work in the army.

These were not published in the open press, but a commentary on them in the "Liberation Army Daily" made it clear that their chief purpose was to give effect to Mao's "principle" on army-party relations. This was, it said, "to place the armed forces under the party's command, and not to allow the armed forces in any way to command the party." It explained that officers and political commissars would share equal status as unit leaders, which would provide safeguards against the tendency of officers "to pursue unilaterally the military viewpoint, and to lean towards militarism."

While important problems in army units were to be discussed at party meetings, it was made clear that this did not apply to "those urgent problems which require prompt action by leading officers." There is no such reservation in the article in the "People's Daily" this week, but it is unthinkable that its invitation to troops to discuss the conduct of forthcoming operations should mean that they are allowed to question their marching orders.

Indeed, the "People's Daily" makes it clear that there must be "maximum centralisation and the strictest discipline." Otherwise, it says, there would be no unity of "will and action" in an army of several millions, and in war "it would not be possible to have either mighty offensiveness or a strong defence."

## Officers' insecurity

What will matter to many officers, however, is the insecurity of their position and the undermining of their authority with which they would now have to reckon in any conflict, at any level, with party officials.

Although the submission of the military to the party has always been implicit in the Communist system, the manner in which it is once again proclaimed and stressed must cause offence to a good many of the professional officers. China's political leaders must have made an issue of it at this time only because they thought that to leave the military caste unmolested would have been even more dangerous to the party's monopoly of power.

There is no evidence on which one could base any conclusions about the relevance of all this to Chinese hostilities. It

THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE  
FEBRUARY 28, 1965

CPYRGHT

CPYRGHT

# How Sharp Are The Dragon's Claws?

By CHALMERS JOHNSON

THREE times since last summer's battle in the Gulf of Tonkin, Communist China has warned that "the 650 million Chinese people will definitely not stand idly by" in the struggle for Vietnam. The latest warning came this month, the day after United States planes bombed North Vietnam in reprisal for the Communist attack on the American base at Pleiku. The Chinese threat is deliberately vague and difficult to evaluate, but as long as the threat of a wider war hangs over Vietnam one obvious interpretation of Peking's words is its readiness to plunge the 2,700,000-man People's Liberation Army into war once again.

How sharp are the dragon's claws? What are the strengths and weaknesses of China's army? Part of the answers are shrouded in secrecy, but enough is known to piece together a realistic analysis of the force we face now and for years to come.

The first fact to remember is a matter of numbers. With its vast population, China has the biggest pool of military manpower of any nation in the world. A decade ago the regime boasted that at a moment's notice it could mobilize more than 10 million men between the ages of 18 and 22 (equal to the entire population of Taiwan); moreover, since the force could be replenished at the rate of 4,400,000 men a year for three years, China's present standing army actually represents about one-fourth of its recruitment capacity.

could be said that the Chinese leaders would not disturb their relations with the army at a time when they might be contemplating China's involvement in the hostilities. But it could be argued, with as much plausibility that the political leaders would launch a reform of this kind only to strengthen their hold on the army in anticipation of hostilities. The analysis of material in the Chinese press unrelated to the army dispute still suggests, however, that the Chinese leaders are anxious to avoid a direct confrontation with the US.

**C**OMPARED to other occupations in Communist China, a soldier does not have a bad life. Under normal conditions the army supplies him with one cotton uniform, two sets of fatigues, two suits of underwear, a pair of leather shoes, two pairs of cloth shoes, and three pairs of rubber shoes each year. He receives a pair of socks every three months and a towel every other month. In addition, he may buy theater tickets and travel on all conveyances at half-price. There is usually a company movie each week.

Despite widespread hunger during the food crises of 1960-62, a soldier continued to receive a monthly ration of 45 catties (one catty equals about 1.3 pounds) of principal food grains—rice in the south, wheat in

the north. Though it seemed to be politically sound to give the army priority over the civilian population, it proved to be a mixed blessing. The secret "Bulletin of Activities" of the army's General Political Department revealed that in some units up to 70 per cent of the men had received letters from their families complaining of mismanagement and malnutrition in the communes. On Jan. 1, 1961, General Hsiao Hua of the P.L.A. General Staff told a conference of political commissars that since "our troops consist of peasants and workers wearing uniforms, when certain localities are troubled by agricultural crises, it is bound to be reflected among the troops. Because of this year's great disasters . . . political problems have greatly increased in the military units."

Increased food production and imports from Canada and Australia have overcome this problem today, but the army may again become politically unreliable in the event of another series of agricultural crises.

In general, however, the Chinese soldier is loyal to the regime and delighted to be in the army. Typically, he is a peasant taken from the land

when completed. And though he has a lower capacity for technical training than do most soldiers in modern armies, he has a greater physical stamina than most Western troops.

According to the 1955 conscription law, all male citizens reaching the age of 18 before June 30 are eligible for the draft that year. Until recently, draftees served three years in the army, four in the air force, and five in the navy. But at its January 1965 session, the National People's Congress lengthened each tour of duty by one year as part of China's current military build-up. Once discharged, all draftees become members of the standing reserve. Women with medical or other special skills are also registered in the reserves.

Since many more young men are eligible for the army in any one year than can possibly be used, the regime can afford to be selective in picking recruits. For example, boys coming from the families of former landlords or rich peasants are automatically excluded as potential security risks, while boys of poor peasant stock are frankly sought for indoctrination in the highly political P.L.A.

**P**OLITICAL training in the Chinese army means studying the "thought of Mao Tse-tung" and attending "think bitterness" meetings, where soldiers hear and relate lurid stories of brutalities China suffered at the hands of foreigners and the Kuomintang in order to heighten their hatred of the enemy and their personal motivation. If the bitterness lectures are designed to prove the power of negative thinking, the study of Maoism is intended to boost morale by improving positive thinking. Using as a text a volume of selected readings from Mao's writings—distributed to every officer and enlisted man—the troops are supposed to be instilled with a belief in the justice of their cause and the wisdom of the Communist party's leadership.

Political education takes up fully 25 per cent of a soldier's time (basic instruction in reading and mathematics occupies 15 per cent of his time and the remaining 60 per cent is spent on military training) and seems to be remarkably effective. So far, no more than a dozen soldiers have fled to Hong Kong.

Intensive indoctrination, even at the expense of military training, is fundamental to Mao's concept of China's army. All armies controlled by Communist parties are torn between two conflicting command philosophies: professionalism vs. Marxist egalitarianism. In the Soviet Union, professionalism finally triumphed after repeated failures to create a force that was genuinely "socialist," and at the same time militarily effective. In China, Communist theory has temporarily won out, and the army is one of the last great strongholds of Mao Tse-tung's basic principle—the "mass line."

**T**HE P.L.A. came into being as a guerrilla army fighting a revolutionary war (hence its revolutionary name). In essence, Mao sees the "mass line" strategy of guerrilla warfare as a specific answer to the question: How can a rebel army, objectively weaker in equipment and training, defeat a superior military force? His answer: Entrap the stronger force in the swamp of an overwhelmingly hostile population. Ideologically mobilized and organized civilians can then supply the rebel army with near-perfect intelligence concerning enemy movements while performing a host of other military support operations.

The rebel army, combining an extremely high level of ideological commitment with superior intelligence information, overcomes its material weakness by fighting the enemy only at times when victory is assured—namely, by laying ambushes with overwhelming numbers and by refusing battle when the enemy appears in greater strength. The summary of the theory is Mao's statement that "man, and not materials, is the decisive factor in war."

Not all military leaders shared Mao's enthusiasm for the "mass line," particularly after the revolution had been won. During and after the Korean War the army was commanded by officers who leaned toward a more conventional "professional" strategy. In 1959 China's first Minister of Defense, Marshal Peng Teh-huai, the commander of the Chinese forces in Korea, bitterly opposed Mao and other

the return to "mass line" techniques in the economy and the militia. But this was the period of the "Great Leap Forward"; Mao fired Peng and gave his post to Marshal Lin Piao, the conqueror of Manchuria during the civil war. He also appointed one of China's "political generals," Lo Jui-ching, the former head of the Ministry of Public Security (state police), as chief of staff.

Like Peng, these two officers have been associated with the Communist movement since the Northern Expedition of 1926-28. They were both on the Long March, and Lo Jui-ching served as Lin Piao's political commissar in Yenan and Shantung during the resistance war against Japan. After taking over from Peng Teh-huai, Lin and Lo restored Mao's "mass line" policies as the basis for administering the army.

**O**NE of China's most serious military weaknesses dates to 1960, when Russia cut off aid. Since then, however, Peking has made strenuous efforts to become self-sufficient and the percentage of Chinese-made equipment is rising rapidly. While it is true that most Chinese weapons still are of Soviet or Czechoslovak manufacture, China today produces all of its own rifles, recoilless weapons, machine guns and mortars. It is replacing worn-out Russian tanks, trucks, artillery pieces, and fighter aircraft with Chinese-made types or copies. In fact, Chinese trucks and artillery may now outnumber Russian equipment. One measure of Peking's military output is an agreement signed last December with Cambodia, committing China to supply heavy artillery and other equipment for 20,000 Cambodian troops.

According to Japanese sources, China's air force totals approximately 2,600 aircraft. About 1,600 are obsolete MIG-15 and MIG-17 jet fighters; the rest are chiefly outmoded light and medium bombers, utility aircraft and helicopters. China has no more than 100 modern MIG-19's which it has been assembling for the past several years.

This collection of aircraft would constitute a modest air force even if it could be fully

utilized (there are no strategic transports, for example). But the real problem is a shortage of spare parts and jet fuel and the consequent curtailment of training hours logged by pilots. In every contest with the Nationalist air force on Taiwan, even before the latter was equipped with modern U. S. air-to-air missiles, the Communists were overwhelmingly defeated. Yet Peking's ability to develop new weapons—if not to supply them in the quantities needed for war—should certainly not be underrated. Lately, for example, China has apparently begun to copy and assemble the delta-wing, supersonic MIG-21 jet fighter.

Another area in which China seems to have made unexpected strides is ground-to-air missiles. Peking claims that it has shot down four Nationalist U-2's since September, 1962, and several of the losses have been acknowledged by Taiwan. It is very doubtful that Russia supplied these rockets since the dates of their use mark the height of the Sino-Soviet quarrel.

China has superb scientists, such as Chien Hsueh-sen, formerly at the California Institute of Technology, who are capable of designing offensive rockets as well as atomic devices; nevertheless, it is significant that recent technical breakthroughs have been in defensive weaponry—jet fighters, anti-aircraft missiles—though even these are still being supplied to operational units in very small numbers.

Even worse limitations beset China's navy, which has virtually no amphibious capability. The navy consists of a few Russian-supplied submarines—an easy target for U. S. hunter-killer subs—and a large fleet of fast motor torpedo boats with the mission of disrupting any invasion task force.

**I**N addition to the shortage of weapons, the Chinese are hampered by the fact that very few men on active duty are combat veterans. In 1950, when the Fourth Field Army crossed the Yalu into North Korea, it had been hardened by 10 to 20 years of continuous and victorious warfare against the Japanese and the

Kuomintang. Since then, only a few select units have seen action—on the Indian border or in seizing Yiklangshan Island (one of the Tachens, captured from Chiang Kai-shek in January, 1955). A few other units have received artillery training in the shelling of Quemoy and Matsu.

Currently, only field grade officers and senior non-commissioned officers have actually had much experience under fire. Marshal Lin Piao is one such veteran and he is regarded as China's greatest tactician; but even his chief of staff, General Lo, has nothing more than a career of political and police duty.

The Chinese Communists, who have traditionally used on-the-job training of military skills, recognize that their army is poorly trained. In 1961, the General Political Department wrote (for internal use):

"Without much training, soldiers were expected to be ready to fight at any time because the skills required were simple and easy to learn. Now conditions are altogether different, for almost all of the men in service and some of the cadres have never seen actual fighting. That is why we must increase our training. Weapons of war, at present more complicated than those of earlier periods, make it necessary for the armed forces to undergo much training before they can be useful."

Adding one year to the period of active service was partly intended to get better-trained men. Yet, except for a few elite units, the army appears to be considerably less competent today, even at its own style of warfare, than it was in Korea.

The Chinese army is best described as a semi-professional force. It lacks the full range of specialization found in the modern scientific army.

The most unprofessional aspect of the army is its close integration with the economy and civilian life. Troops help bring in the harvests, reclaim marginal land, build roads and railroads, and train local militia troops. The army also raises its own pork, poultry

and vegetables and occasionally one reads in military bulletins of officers discovering vegetable vines hanging from radio antennas, among other unmilitary practices. Nevertheless, the army's own agricultural production not only helps to feed its men but also aids the national economy; in 1961 the military turned over 54,000 army-bred pigs to the state for export.

**SUPPLEMENTING** the army is the world's largest militia force, designed to turn the entire population into a "spiritual atom bomb." Actually, it is more of a dupe and in most areas it does little more than hold summer encampments or drilling sessions with wooden spears. In the southeastern provinces, however, peasant militiamen have proved invaluable by enforcing a recently imposed curfew and in capturing Kuomintang agents.

In 1961, according to the Chinese press, militiamen were abusing their authority and even rubbing people on the highways; in some areas of the country they were known to the local population as "rabid dogs." Undermined by its reputation and opposed by the regular army, the militia was temporarily allowed to lapse. In late 1964, however, Mao revived it as part of China's preparedness campaign following the Gulf of Tonkin incident. There are now two kinds of militia: basic and general. The basic militia includes army reservists, cadres and party members. The general militia is composed of all other men between the ages of 18 and 55. Though the numbers do not mean much, both branches of the militia now total an estimated 200 million members.

Similarly, the numbers that comprise the regular army are also somewhat deceptive. As of last December, the ground forces were organized into 40 armies and 38 independent divisions, plus miscellaneous specialized regiments located in various areas of the country. According to Nationalist intelligence reports, the

one closest to the Vietnamese border) contains several crack units; coastal Kwangtung province and Hainan Island in southeast China together have

six armies and two independent divisions; Kwangsi, further west, has one army and four divisions; and Hunan, to the northwest, has two divisions. The Foochow and Nanking Military Regions opposite Taiwan, the Tsinan Military Region around Peking, the Shenyang Military Region protecting Manchuria, the Tibet Military Region, and the Sinkiang Military Region all have powerful forces.

Calculating on the basis of 40,000 men per army and 10,000 per division, the total is 1,980,000 men. Then there are approximately 500,000 public security troops, 200,000 air force personnel, 100,000 sailors, 50,000 men in the air defense forces. The grand total is better than 2.7 million men.

Not all of them, however, are ready to go to war. The Chinese army is administered through a system of 13 military regions which are, in turn, broken down into 23 military districts conforming to provincial boundaries. Every province has its army, unattached division, or regiment; but many of these units perform purely garrison or economic duties. Certainly not all divisions are either equipped with modern military equipment or trained to use it.

But what the Chinese Communist army lacks in modern weapons, training and mechanized transportation it attempts to make up by emphasizing its advantages in stamina, morale, numbers and a specialized strategy. Infantry operations at night are more difficult to lead and control; troops require high morale to avoid panic when they lose contact with their commanders. Yet the Chinese have perfected the night march and

night assault.

General S. L. A. Marshall once described a typical Communist offensive in Korea: "Night attacks were so much the rule that any exception came as a surprise. The advancing columns took such natural routes as draws or stream beds, deploying as soon as they met resistance. Combat groups then peeled off from the tactical columns one at a time and closed with rifles, submachine guns and grenades. Once engaged and under fire, the attackers hit the ground. Rising at any lull, they came on until engaged again; but when fully committed, they did not relinquish the attack even when riddled with casualties... The result of several such penetrations on a battalion front could be devastating."

If the Chinese army can match its performance in Korea, the results could be equally devastating in Southeast Asia. The U. S. Air Force and Navy would take a heavy toll of Chinese infantrymen, but even in the atomic age only an army can finally stop another army.

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## Fact Sheet

[REDACTED] 22 November 1965

Housing Problems in the USSR\*Summary and Conclusions

Housing continues to be one of the glaringly inadequate sectors of the Soviet economy. In only one year of the current seven-year plan (1959-65) has the plan for housing been fulfilled, and since 1960 the construction of new housing space has actually fallen off. As for quality, slapdash methods of construction, monotony of architecture and design, and lack of adequate water, gas, and other utilities characterize Soviet housing now, as they did at the beginning of the plan period. The recent emphasis placed on building cooperative apartments has meant little for the general supply of housing, but rather has enabled the regime to increase greatly the price of part of the housing stock without increasing rents. Moreover, the building of private houses -- once a bright spot in the Soviet housing picture -- has shrunk because of official discouragement.

The failure of Soviet construction of urban-type housing to expand or even to meet plans during the seven-year plan period is shown in the following tabulation (in million square meters):

<u>Year</u>	<u>Total Space</u>	
	<u>Planned**</u>	<u>Completed</u>
1959	80.0	80.7
1960	101.0	82.8
1961	96.0	80.2
1962	95.6	80.5
1963	91.0	79.3
1964	77.0	74.6
1965	84.0	

Even in the unlikely event that the 1965 plan is fulfilled, results under the seven-year plan, which called for the construction of 650 million to 660 million square meters (sq m) of urban-type housing space, will fall short by about 15 percent. Furthermore, the separate goal of 7 million new houses to be built by collective farmers during the plan period will be met only halfway.

\* Estimates and conclusions as of 15 September 1965.

\*\* Annual plans. The sum of the annual plans does not agree with the seven-year plan goal.

(Cont.)

Housing problems in the USSR are part and parcel of the low priority assigned to the consumer in the allocation of economic resources. The magnitude of the housing problem is comparable to the magnitude of the agricultural problem, although there has been less public attention given to housing. Even if the 1959-64 rate of housing construction were doubled in the next five-year plan period (1966-70), the Soviet consumer would have slightly less than the 9 sq m of per capita living space recognized by the USSR itself as the minimum requirement for health and decency. (The average per capita living space at the present time is only 5.7 sq m, about the same as at the start of the seven-year plan period.) "Catching up" with Western Europe in housing, let alone with that in the United States, seems an impossible task for the next few years. The Brezhnev-Kosygin administration has posed as the friend of the consumer, but its allocation of first priority to defense and to industry clearly prevents any immediate jump in consumer standards -- and this is particularly true for housing.

Housing Plans and Completion

It is evident from even a superficial examination of the Soviet economy that housing is still an unsolved problem in the Soviet Union. Instead of the 887 million sq m of total space of housing that was planned to be constructed in the USSR during the seven-year plan period, only 678 million square meters (sq m), or about three-fourths, will be built. (See Table 1.)

Table 1

USSR: Planned Construction and Actual Completion of Housing, by Category  
1959-65

	<u>Total Housing</u>	<u>Urban-Type</u>		<u>For Collective Farmers and the Rural Intelligentsia</u>
		<u>State</u>	<u>Other</u>	
		<u>Million Square Meters</u>		
Planned	887	424	230	233
Completed <sup>a</sup>	678	399	163	116
		<u>Percent</u>		
Fulfilled	76.4	94.1	70.9	49.8

a. Based on the assumption that the plan for housing in 1965 will be fulfilled.

Published statistics on the area of urban-type housing planned and the area built reveal that, for the seven-year plan period, only in the first year (1959), have housing completions equaled the plan. In 1964 the plan for urban-type housing was 15 percent lower than the plan for 1963 and 3 percent lower than actual completions in 1963, but it was still underfilled by more than 3 percent. Even if completions in 1965 equal the plan, total completions of urban-type housing during the seven-year plan period will be 87.9 million to 97.9 million sq m short of the goal of 650 million to 660 million sq m. Construction of urban-type housing, therefore, lags more than a year, or about 15 percent below the goal established by the plan.

In addition to urban-type housing, the seven-year plan indicates that collective farmers and the rural intelligentsia were to build approximately 7 million houses, or an estimated 233 million sq m of housing. This part of the plan will be fulfilled approximately 50 percent.

In presenting the 1965 plan, Premier Kosygin stated that the area of urban-type housing to be commissioned in 1965 (84 million sq m) would be the greatest amount ever achieved in the Soviet Union. Although the statement is literally true, the 1965 plan for the total area of housing is lower by about 12 million sq m than the total amount built in 1959.

#### Individual and State Housing

In the last few years individual housing has been curtailed by numerous factors: failure to make land available, failure to provide utilities to the land that is made available, lack of construction materials, restriction on credit, and confiscation of individual houses already built. Recent events suggest a relaxing of this restrictive policy. In an article in Izvestiya, Dmitriy S. Pudikov, chief of the long-term credit department of the Construction Bank of the USSR and author of a number of articles on private and cooperative housing, urged all-out support for building private homes.

Although experience indicates that the Soviet people desire individual houses and will build private houses if land, materials, and credit are made available, this solution of the housing problem has serious economic as well as ideological shortcomings. These ideological faults may be temporarily ignored on the basis of expediency. Further expansion of "urban sprawl," however, promoted by encouraging individual housing, requires huge expenditures for public utilities -- transportation, water, sewer, fuel, and power lines. Supplying these services to new areas of apartment housing requires expenditure of considerable construction effort and resources. Supplying the same services to areas of single-family dwellings increases the cost significantly.

Limitation of individual houses in large urban areas is inevitable. In a market economy the limitation is affected by changes in the price of land. Even in a market economy, however, the existence of zoning restrictions and similar "political" decisions strongly influences use of land. In the USSR, lack of economically determined prices for land forces all decisions on use of land into the political arena.

Although recent efforts to encourage construction of housing by individuals may help to solve housing problems in the smaller urban and rural areas, solution of the major housing problem, that of large urban areas, will continue to depend primarily on construction of housing by the state or by housing construction cooperatives.

#### Housing Construction Cooperatives

A housing construction cooperative is formed by a group of individuals, each of whom furnishes the cost of constructing an apartment in a multiapartment house. Usually the individual furnishes 40 percent of the estimated cost of the apartment from his own funds and borrows the balance to be paid back over a period of 10 to 15 years. Except for source of financing, housing built by cooperatives and housing built by the state are identical. Both types use the same plans, the same materials, and the same construction organizations, and are supervised by the same state organizations. The incentive of the individual for joining a cooperative is that he moves to the front of the long housing queue. The incentive of the government for sponsoring cooperatives is that the price of housing is greatly raised for those willing to pay the price, but without the adverse publicity of an overt price increase.

Although housing cooperatives constructed only 2 percent of all housing built in the USSR during the seven-year plan period, they are receiving increasing attention from Soviet authorities. Cooperative housing construction rose from insignificant amounts in 1960 to 4.8 million sq m in 1964, more than 5 percent of total housing commissioned. The 1965 plan provides for 7.5 million sq m, or almost 8 percent of all housing, to come from this source. Officials of the Moscow office of the Construction Bank assert that if conditions of financing housing cooperatives were liberalized for the USSR as a whole, the share of housing built by cooperatives would increase to at least 50 percent.

Although this overly optimistic view of housing cooperatives probably will not be fully realized in the next several years,\* measures have

\* Even the reduced down payments suggested are equal to or exceed a year's wages for the average worker. The monthly payment -- even for a 25-year loan -- is at least two to three times the rental paid for state housing. If rent of state housing were raised to a level more nearly covering cost, the added cost of going to the head of the queue would be reduced, but then more people would try.

been taken to make construction of cooperatives more attractive to the population. The Council of Ministers of the USSR adopted a decree on 19 November 1964 which stipulated that (1) land allocations for housing cooperatives should be speeded up; (2) housing cooperatives would be relieved of the expense of razing old structures and of reimbursing private individuals for crops on allocated land; (3) occupancy of cooperative housing was restricted to members and their families; (4) cost of cooperative housing construction should be calculated with respect to prices, norms, and procedures established for state housing; (5) as of 1 January 1965, interest charges would be reduced from 1 percent to 0.5 percent; (6) in parts of Asiatic USSR, the down payment was to be reduced from 40 percent to 30 percent and the time for repayment extended from 10 to 20 years; and (7) improved finishing and more complete installations in the residential buildings might be permitted if paid for by the members of a housing cooperative.

Although the main incentive for individuals to join housing cooperatives is to get needed housing space more quickly, a secondary incentive is the possibility of benefiting from slightly more flexible design and better finish and equipment. The conflict between quantity and quality of housing and the difficulty of departing from standard design are illustrated by the following quotation from a Soviet article on housing:

Cooperative housing is now being built according to estimated costs of state construction, is fully provided with building materials, and is included in the plan for contract work on a par with state construction. By paying extra, the cooperatives may build houses with higher ceilings, so long as this does not conflict with standard plans and does not require retooling of the housing-structural plants, and with higher quality finish in the apartments and improved sanitary and technical equipment.

#### Housing Space Per Capita

In urban areas of the USSR the minimum health and decency goal is 9 sq m of living space of 13.5 sq m of total space per person -- at least 4.9 sq m more total space than achieved by the end of 1964.\* Therefore, an addition of 673 million sq m, or 9 times the construction of urban-type housing in 1964, must be added to urban and state sector rural housing to meet the per capita space goals for the present urban and state sector rural population. On the assumption that the urban and state-related rural population will continue to grow by approximately 3 million persons per year and that approximately 2 percent of the housing stock will be retired from service each year, almost 50 million sq m of urban-type housing must be built each year just to maintain the present level of 8.6 sq m of total space per capita.

\* Living space means living, dining and bedrooms. Total space includes in addition, kitchens and bathrooms.

Attainment of the Soviet Union's goal of 13.5 sq m of housing per person by 1970 is very doubtful because it would require doubling the volume of construction achieved in the past six years. Achievement of the goal by 1980, however, would require average annual completions to increase by only 5 percent per year, a not unreasonable task.

Actual Soviet housing of 8 to 9 sq m of total space per capita is very low compared with the amounts achieved in the West -- approximately 20 sq m in Western Europe and 30 sq m in the United States. "Catching up" with Western Europe in housing, let alone the US, seems an impossible task for the next several years.

#### Quality of Housing Construction

The Soviet Union has consistently sacrificed quality for quantity in housing. The immediate problem has been to get the populace housed in some sort of minimum comfort. Thus, by Western standards, the quality of housing has been extremely poor. Soviet leaders and journalists recognize the poor quality and report, for example, that in one city, of 115 buildings put into service, 108 had imperfections and serious defects. The Soviet press is continually exhorting builders to improve quality.

In the rush to produce and to put into use additional housing space, there is lack of quality control and inspection. Many houses are occupied without certification by the state commission even though they have a large number of serious defects and imperfections. For example, in Irkutsk, apartment buildings were put into use with no electric illumination and with unworkable heating systems.

The quality of materials leaves much to be desired. The sand and gravel used for producing concrete and mortar frequently contain dirt and other foreign matter that degrade the quality of the concrete produced. The forms used for concrete panels are poorly dimensioned and poorly maintained; the result is concrete panels that are irregular in shape and have poor surfaces. Because joint designs and sealing materials have not been developed properly, in many buildings the joints between panels are open, allowing penetration of both wind and moisture. Brick is still the predominant material used for walls, but most of the brick produced is weak, irregular in form, cracked, and prone to frost damage. The mortar used to join the bricks is poor and little care is taken in controlling the quality and proportions of water, cement, and sand. Lumber is often uncured and thus causes warping and shrinking of floors, window frames, and other wooden parts.

Lack of permanent cadres of skilled workers, resulting from high labor turnover, and use of unskilled volunteer workers contribute to the low quality of housing, especially noticeable in the finishing work. In addition, little use is made of instruments to insure that buildings are level and plumb when erected.

Failure to Provide Services

Throughout the USSR there are examples of housing that has been built but has not been occupied, because of failure to supply water, sewer, electrical, heating and transportation facilities. In addition, there are numerous complaints of failure to provide such services as schools, shops, and recreation facilities in or near new housing areas. The failure to coordinate the construction of housing and the supply of services has been a major annoyance for a long time, and the end is not in sight.

The administration of the housing economy is antiquated, not having been reviewed for 35 years. Responsibility and funds are dispersed among numerous ministries and departments. Finances that could be allocated for building repair are spent on a multitude of people engaged mainly in clerical work. Thousands of buildings have not been repaired in time. In general, the tenant does little to alleviate the problem of maintenance, because of lack of incentive and because of the difficulty of obtaining the necessary materials for making repairs.

Investment in Housing

During the seven-year plan period the USSR will invest more than 55 billion rubles in housing. Total annual investment in housing has declined somewhat during 1959-64, with 1964 investment approximately 88 percent of 1959 investment. An estimate of the capital investment required to fulfill the 1965 plan for housing is about 98 percent of the 1959 investment.

The composition of the total investment in housing has changed significantly during the period. In 1959, 37 percent of the total housing investment was for individual housing -- urban and rural, including houses built by collective farmers -- but in 1964 the share for this category dropped to about 22 percent and is expected to be somewhat less in 1965. Investment in individual housing steadily decreased until by 1964 it was about one-half that of 1959; small increases in investment by the state sector together with investment in housing cooperatives have maintained total investment at relatively constant absolute levels.

During the seven-year plan period, however, housing construction has been declining in importance as a recipient of investment funds. In 1958, 25 percent of all investment in the USSR was devoted to housing construction, but by 1963, the share of total investment used for housing construction had declined to 18 percent. The estimate for 1964 and 1965 is even lower. The decline in housing construction reflects shifting priorities in Soviet resource allocation. Increasingly priority has been given to the so-called productive investment in industry and agriculture over nonproductive investment in housing for acquiring relatively scarce building materials.

During both the fourth and fifth five-year plan periods (1946-50 and 1951-55, respectively), about 20 percent of all investment in the USSR

was devoted to housing construction. If during the coming years a similar share of total investment were to be used for housing construction, the per capita goal of 13.5 sq m of total housing space could be reached during 1971-80.

The USSR is devoting a smaller share of capital investment to housing than is the US. During the period 1960-63 in the USSR, about 20 percent of total capital investment went to housing, compared to 24 percent in the US. A comparison of the share of total construction activity devoted to housing in each country also indicates that the USSR is devoting a smaller share than is the US -- 32 percent in the USSR and 40 percent in the US.

If the USSR were to reassess its objectives and allocate capital investment and construction resources to housing to the same degree as the US, the volume of housing available to the Soviet people would meet their present goal in the 1970's. At the present time, however, although Kosygin has indicated that the next five-year plan should be designed to "insure a more rapid rate of improvement of the people's living standards," there is no firm indication that housing in the USSR is going to receive this relatively greater share of investment in the near future.